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K e v in  S g h il b r a g k
Peter W inch published his provocative anti-positivist manifesto. The 
Idea 0/ a  Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy in 1958, and he drew 
out the book’s im ^ications for the study of religions in his essay 
“f^d c rs tan d in g  a primitive society” in 1964. In the book, he draws 
on W itt^ m tc in ’s later philosophy to argue that meaningful behavior 
always involves following social rules, and since following a rule in- 
volves u d c rs ta n d in g  it, the goal of the social sciences cannot or, at 
least, should not be the explanation of behavior, as if people obey 
laws the way that falling apples thoughtlessly obey the law of gravity. 
T he social sciences should instead be ii^ rp rc tiv c , with the goal of 
u d c rs ta n d in g . Furtherm ore, the study of religion (Winch took the 
example of Zandc witchcraft) must first identify the point of the 
^ a c tic c  and should not assume that all cultural fa c tic e s  are like 
science in that they aim at controlling the natural world. Together, 
the two works inspired an enormous debate on the scope of rational- 
ity and the nature of religion.
T he only other book-lcngth work on W inch I know is Colin Lyas’ 
Peter Winch (Acumen, 1999). But whereas that book is ii^o d u cto ry , 
expository, and ym pathctic , this one is c r id c a l-a n d  judiciously so. 
W ith a ^ ilo s o p h c r’s eye, Tcrncr sorts out and clarifies W inch’s analy- 
sis of meaningful behavior, his arguments against c^lm ^atory  social 
science, and his reading o fZ ande magic. He also surveys the different 
criticisms of W inch’s project, sometimes defending him, bu t often 
identifying where W inch’s claims are ambiguous or his arguments 
weak. Tcrncr rightly says that W inch’s work can be both inspiring and 
infuriating, bu t Tcrncr has a gift for r t i^ ^ tfo rw a rd  writing and good 
examples. W ith the exception of an uimcccssary chapter on two of 
W inch’s epigones, his critique cuts to the im portant issues.
For Ferner, the central problem  with W inch’s ^ p ro a c h  is that he 
so resolutely overlooks the role of instrum ental action in hum an life 
in favor of attention to commufocativc action. As Lerner puts it, 
W inch favors the definition of hum ans as language users over that of 
hum ans as tool users. This leads W inch to an overly contemplative 
understanding of the social sciences in which they provide us with the
© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leirlen, 2003 Method &  Theory in the Study o f Religion
REVIEWS112
different possibilities of making sense of hum an life bu t don’t provide 
us with ^ a c tic a l  inform ation about predicting or eontrolling hum an 
behavior. W inch’s ignoring of im trum cntal action also leads him to 
an cxprcssivist reading of Zandc witchcraft in which magical and 
religious praetiees symbolically express one’s attitudes towards the 
contingencies of life bu t do not seek to control those contingencies. 
Lcrncr rightly argues that W inch’s i^c rp rc ta tio n  of the Azandc is 
powerfully o n tra d ic tc d  by ctlm ographic record, H e also rccom- 
mends an ^ ^ c c ia t io n  of w hat he calls “im t^ m c n ta l pluralism ”, by 
which he means to call attention to the fact that different instrum en- 
tal fa c t ic e s  operate with different standards. Psychotherapy, for ex- 
ample, has a lower expectation of success than c !^n ccrin g , though 
both are im trum cntal. Instrum ental fa c t ic e s  also vary as they per- 
m it m ore or less pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, m ore or less 
risk-taking, or m ore or less attention to aesthetics.
L erner’s im trum cntal pluralism is a valid observation about the 
variety of standards at work in im trum cntal fa c tic e s , and Zande 
magic may include such concerns (an idea that Lcrncr suggests but 
does not explore). But it is not plausible that if W inch ^ p rc c ia tc d  
Lerner’s idea he could accept the instrumentality of magic. For one 
thing, nothing W inch says denies this variety, and for another. 
W inch’s thesis is not that different modes of social life are “different”, 
bu t rather that there are some that are not im trum cntal. I think that 
one sees here a risk run  by those who oppose W inch, namely, that his 
position is so dram atic and onc-sidcd (soeial science is interpretive, 
not explanatory; religion is expressive, not im trumcntal) that it is easy 
for his critics to fell into the opposite extreme. Lcrncr is ^ ! ^ n c in g  
that W inch is w rong to exclude explanation from the social sciences 
and im trum cntal interests from religion and magic. But it would be 
nice to see W inch’s position not just answered, bu t “taken u p ” or 
synthesized, in Hegel’s sense, into a m ore complete philosophy of the 
social sciences that ^ ^ c c ia tc s  the role of both interpretation and 
c ^ la n a tio n . And cannot a rcligion— or perhaps even a single prayer 
— pursue both practical concerns and m ct^h y sica l contemplation? 
This said, however, Lcrncr has produced a valuable guide to W inch’s 
W itt^ m tc in ian  approach to the study of religion. Clearly written 
and argued, it is in fact the best book on the subject.
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